Marich: A Query-efficient Distributionally Equivalent Model Extraction Attack using Public Data

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Model Extraction Attack

The Framework



Taxonomy of Model Extraction Attacks

What's out there?

- **Access to model:** White-box or black-box [TZJ+16]
- **Query dataset:** Synthetic [TZJ+16], perturbed version of private [PMG+17] or public [PGS+20]
- **Response to query:** Prediction distribution [JCB+20], gradients [MSDH19] or predicted label [PMG+17]
- **Model class:** Linear [MSDH19], neural network [MSDH19, JCB+20], or CNN [CSBB+18]
- **Objective of extraction:** Task accuracy [JCB+20], fidelity [PGS+20], or functional equivalence [PMG+17]

Taxonomy of Model Extraction Attacks

Best of old and new worlds!

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  $\longrightarrow$ model-agnostic
- **Objective:** Task accuracy [JCB+20], fidelity [PGS+20], or functional equivalence [PMG+17]

Can we define an information-theoretic objective that can cover the utilities of these objective?

Distributionally Equivalent Model Extraction

Match the Prediction Distributions

Observations

1. Any classification model f^T and a data generating distribution $\mathscr{D}^Q$ together induces a predictive distribution over label-input pairs (Y, X).

2. Any utility metric, e.g. accuracy, fidelity, are functionals computed on this joint distribution.

Intuition: Design an extraction attack that selects a set of queries $\mathscr{D}^Q$ and creates an extracted model f^E_ω to minimise the KL-divergence between the induced joint distributions.

$$(\omega^*_{\min}, \mathscr{D}^Q_{\min}) \triangleq \underset{\omega, \mathscr{D}_Q}{\operatorname{argmin}} \; D_{\mathrm{KL}}\left(\Pr(f^T_{\theta^*}(Q), Q) \| \Pr(f^E_\omega(Q), Q)\right)$$

Max-Information Model Extraction

Leak Information about the Prediction Distribution

Goal of Privacy Attack

To maximially leak privacy of a target model and a private dataset, we should increase the information content passed from predictive distribution of the target model to that of the extracted model.

Intuition: An extracted model f^E and a query distribution should aim to maximise the mutual information between the joint distributions of input features $Q \sim \mathcal{D}^Q$ and predicted labels induced by f^E and that of the target model f^T.

$$(\omega^*_{\max}, \mathcal{D}^Q_{\max}) \triangleq \underset{\omega, \mathcal{D}_Q}{\operatorname{argmax}} \; \mathrm{I}\left(\Pr(f^T_{\theta^*}(Q), Q) \| \Pr(f^E_\omega(Q), Q)\right)$$

A Variational Formulation of Model Extraction

Reducing the Attacks to an Optimisation Problem

Upper Bounding Distributional Closeness

If we choose KL-divergence as the similarity metric, then for a query generating distribution $\mathscr{D}^Q$

$$D_{\mathrm{KL}}\left(\Pr(f^T_{\theta^*}(Q), Q) \| \Pr(f^E_{\omega^*_{\mathrm{DEq}}}(Q), Q)\right) \leq \min_{\omega} \boxed{E_Q[\, l(f^T_{\theta^*}(Q), f^E_{\omega}(Q))]} - \boxed{H(f^E_{\omega}(Q))}$$

Lower Bounding Information Leakage

For any given $\mathscr{D}^Q$, the information leaked by any max-information attack is lower bounded as:

$$\mathrm{I}\left(\Pr(f^T_{\theta^*}(Q), Q) \| \Pr(f^E_{\omega^*_{\mathrm{min}}}(Q), Q)\right) \geq \max_{\omega} -\boxed{E_Q[\, l(f^T_{\theta^*}(Q), f^E_{\omega}(Q))]} + \boxed{H(f^E_{\omega}(Q))}$$

Marich: Distributionally Equivalent and Max-Information Extraction

Entropy of Predictions and Model Mismatch-guided Query Selection

At every round t, Marich selects queries Q_t satisfying

$$Q_t = \underset{Q \in \mathbf{D}^Q}{\operatorname{argmax}} \boxed{-\frac{1}{t}\sum_{i=1}^{t-1} l(f^T_{\theta^*}(Q_i \cup Q), f^E_{\omega_{t-1}}(Q_i \cup Q))} + \boxed{\sum_{i=1}^{t-1} H(f^E_{\omega_{t-1}}(Q_i \cup Q))}$$



Use Q_t to train the extracted model and update it to $f^E_{\omega_t}$.

Quality of Model Extraction

Task Accuracy



(a) LR with EMNIST

(b) ResNet18 with STL10

(c) BERT with AGNews

Quality of Model Extraction

Distributional Closeness



(a) LR with EMNIST

(b) BERT with AGNews

Quality of Model Extraction

Informativeness of Extraction Leading to Membership Inference

Member dataset	Target model	Query Dataset	Algorithm	#Queries	MI acc.	MI agreement	MI agreement AUC
MNIST	LR	-	-	50,000	87.99%	-	-
		-	-	50,000	92.30%	-	-
		EMNIST	**MARICH**	5,130	88.58%	92.82%	**92.73%**
		CIFAR10	**MARICH**	1,420	**94.27%**	**93.97%**	92.43%
		EMNIST	Random	5,130	89.61%	91.01%	91.11%
		CIFAR10	Random	1,420	92.61%	89.84%	85.79%
CIFAR10	Resnet18	-	-	40,000	79.35%	-	-
		STL10	**MARICH**	6,950	**93.90%**	**75.52%**	**76.69%**
		STL10	Random	6,950	92.32%	75.25%	75.83%
BBCNews	BERT	-	-	1,490	**98.61%**	-	-
		AGNews	**MARICH**	1,070	94.42%	**91.02%**	**82.62%**
		AGNews	Random	1,070	89.17%	86.93%	58.64%

Performance against ε-DP Defenses

Privacy Level $\varepsilon \geq 2$ cannot Protect Much



(a) LR by EMNIST

(b) LR by CIFAR10

Impact of Model Mismatch

More Expressive Models can Steal Low Expressive Models



(a) LR extracted by LR vs. LR extracted by CNN



(b) CNN extracted by CNN vs. CNN extracted by LR

Marich is a model-agnostic extraction algorithm that adaptively selects a small subset of a public dataset to maximise information leakage from f^T.



Can we develop a theoretical characterisation of the capabilities and limitations of these attacks?

For further details, please visit: `https://github.com/Debabrota-Basu/marich`

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Marich: Distributionally Equivalent and Max-Information Extraction

Algorithm Marich

//* Initialisation of the extracted model*// $\triangleright$ Phase 1
$Q_0^{train} \leftarrow n_0$ datapoints randomly chosen from D^Q
$Y_0^{train} \leftarrow f^T(Q_0^{train})$ $\triangleright$ Query the target model f^T with Q_0^{train}
$f_0^E \leftarrow$ Train f^E with $(Q_0^{train}, Y_0^{train})$ for E_{max} epochs
//* Adaptive query selection*// $\triangleright$ Phase 2
for $t \leftarrow 1$ to T **do**
    $Q_t^{entropy} \leftarrow$ EntropySampling$(f_{t-1}^E, \mathrm{D}^Q \setminus Q_{t-1}^{train}, B)$
    $Q_t^{grad} \leftarrow$ EntropyGradientSampling$(f_{t-1}^E, Q_t^{entropy}, \gamma_1 B)$
    $Q_t^{loss} \leftarrow$ LossSampling$(f_{t-1}^E, Q_t^{grad}, Q_{t-1}^{train}, Y_{t-1}^{train}, \gamma_1\gamma_2 B)$
    $Y_t^{new} \leftarrow f^T(Q_t^{loss})$ $\triangleright$ Query the target model f^T with Q_t^{loss}
    $Q_t^{train} \leftarrow Q_{t-1}^{train} \cup Q_t^{loss}$, $Y_t^{train} \leftarrow Y_{t-1}^{train} \cup Y_t^{new}$
    $f_t^E \leftarrow$ Train f_{t-1}^E with $(Q_t^{train}, Y_t^{train})$ for $E_{\max}$ epochs
end for

Comparing Sampling Strategies



Quality of Extraction by Marich

Parametric Fidelity



LR with EMNIST

Quality of Extraction by Marich

Agreement in Predictions



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Membership Inference with Marich

Informativeness leading to Membership Inference

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